The multisensory basis of the self:From body to identity to others by Tsakiris, Manos
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=pqje20
Download by: [141.255.84.33] Date: 25 April 2016, At: 22:22
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
ISSN: 1747-0218 (Print) 1747-0226 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/pqje20
The multisensory basis of the self: from body to
identity to others
Manos Tsakiris
To cite this article: Manos Tsakiris (2016): The multisensory basis of the self: from
body to identity to others, The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, DOI:
10.1080/17470218.2016.1181768
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2016.1181768
Accepted author version posted online: 21
Apr 2016.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 5
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Multisensory Basis of the Self 
 
1 
 
Publisher: Taylor & Francis & The Experimental Psychology Society 
Journal: The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 
DOI: 10.1080/17470218.2016.1181768 
 
The multisensory basis of the self: from body to 
identity to others 
 
Manos Tsakiris 
Lab of Action & Body, Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway University of London, 
Egham, Surrey, UK 
*corresponding author: Tsakiris, M. (manos.tsakiris@rhul.ac.uk) 
 
Acknowledgements: 
MT was supported by the European Research Council (ERC-2010-StG-262853) under the 
FP7, and ESRC Research Grant ES/K013378/1 
 
 
 
 
Word count: 6,108 (excl. references)  
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
41
.25
5.8
4.3
3]
 at
 22
:22
 25
 A
pr
il 2
01
6 
Multisensory Basis of the Self 
 
2 
 
Abstract 
By grounding the self in the body, experimental psychology has taken the body as the 
starting point for a science of the self. One fundamental dimension of the bodily self is the 
sense of body-ownership that refers to the special perceptual status of one’s own body, the 
feeling that ‘‘my body’’ belongs to me. The primary aim of this review article is to highlight 
recent advances in the study of body-ownership and our understanding of the underlying 
neurocognitive processes in three ways. I first consider how the sense of body-ownership 
has been investigated and elucidated in the context of multisensory integration. Beyond 
exteroception, recent studies have considered how this exteroceptively-driven sense of 
body-ownership can be linked to the other side of embodiment, that of the unobservable, 
yet felt interoceptive body, suggesting that these two sides of embodiment interact to 
provide a unifying bodily self. Lastly, the multisensorial understanding of the self has shown 
to have implications for our understanding of social relationships, especially in the context 
of self-other boundaries. Taken together, these three research strands motivate a unified 
model of the self inspired by current predictive coding models.  
Keywords: self, body-awareness, multisensory, interoception, social cognition, body-
ownership 
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1. Introduction: Experimenting with the self 
The self is first and foremost situated within a body.  As the leading social psychologist R 
Baumeister famously wrote “Everywhere in the world, self starts with body”. Over the last 
30 years, several lines of research from what became known as the embodied cognition 
approach have converged to suggest that cognitive processes are deeply rooted in the 
body’s interactions with the world (for a review see Wilson, 2002). For example, influential 
motor theories of perception have inspired new lines of research that allowed us to 
consider self-awareness and social interactions through the lens of sensorimotor embodied 
processing (Prinz, 2012). By grounding the self in the body, psychology could, at last, 
overcome Cartesianism, and make the bodily self the starting point for a science of the self. 
One fundamental dimension of the bodily self, but by no means the only one (see for 
example the sense of agency, Synfozik, Vosgerau & Neuen, 2008; Tsakiris, Schutz-Bosbach & 
Gallagher, 2007), is the sense of body-ownership that refers to the special perceptual status 
of one’s own body, which makes bodily sensations seem unique to oneself, that is, the 
feeling that ‘‘my body’’ belongs to me (Gallagher 2000). The primary aim of this review 
article is to highlight recent advances in the study of body-ownership and our understanding 
of the underlying neurocognitive processes in three ways. The first step is to consider how 
the experience of this body as mine has been addressed mainly in the context of 
multisensory integration. The second step is to consider how this exteroceptively-driven 
sense of body-ownership can be linked to the other side of embodiment, that of the 
unobservable, yet felt interoceptive body. The third step is to consider the implications that 
this multisensorial understanding of the self has for our understanding of social 
relationships, especially in the context of self-other boundaries. Taken together, these three 
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research strands motivate the need for the development of a unified model of the self that 
resonates with current predictive coding models of information processing.  
2. The exteroceptive model of the bodily self 
The key question of how the brain produces the experience of this body as mine has been 
addressed mainly in the context of multisensory integration. For example, in the Rubber 
Hand Illusion (RHI; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) watching a rubber hand being stroked 
synchronously with one’s own unseen hand causes the rubber hand to be experienced as 
part of one’s body (for a review see Tsakiris, 2010). Over the last 20 years, the RHI has been 
established as one of the most important experimental paradigms that allows the controlled 
manipulation of the experience of body-ownership. While the underlying mechanisms, 
behavioral, physiological and phenomenological consequences of the illusion have been 
described in detail elsewhere (Blanke, 2012; Blanke, Slater & Serino, 2015; Tsakiris, 2010), it 
is important to highlight here certain key features that are particularly relevant for 
understanding the relation between the exteroceptive and interoceptive models of the self 
that will follow in Section 3.  
First, while not sufficient by itself (see Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris, Carpenter, James & 
Fotopoulou, 2010), synchronous multisensory (i.e. visuo-tactile in most cases) stimulation is 
the main cause that drives the RHI and the resulting change in body-ownership (Botvinick & 
Cohen, 1998). Multisensory processing aims at the integration of sensory signals and the 
resolution of potential conflicts to generate a coherent representation of the world and the 
body on the basis of the available sensory evidence. The RHI reflects a three-way interaction 
between vision, touch, and proprioception: vision of tactile stimulation on the rubber hand 
captures the tactile sensation on the participant’s own hand, and this visual capture results 
in a mislocalization of the felt location of one’s own unseen hand towards the spatial 
location of the visual percept (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). Second, at the phenomenological 
level, the RHI has been successfully used as a model instance of embodiment. Longo et al 
(2008) characterized the subjective experience of body-ownership during the RHI, revealing 
that this consists of distinct components, such as ownership of the limb, its location and the 
sense of control over it. Third, the change in body-ownership as a result of the RHI can in 
turn change one’s body image as participants who experienced the RHI perceived their hand 
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and the rubber hand as significantly more similar in terms of their appearance (Longo et al, 
2009), than participants who did not experience the illusion, suggesting that ownership 
leads to changes in perceived physical similarity.  
Beyond these changes, the RHI literature has indicated that the experience of owning the 
rubber hand results in significant alterations in the way one’s own real hand is processed at 
the introspective (Longo et al, 2008) and physiological level (Moseley et al, 2008). 
Introspectively, participants feel as if their own hand had disappeared (Longo et al, 2008), 
suggesting that the changes caused by RHI do not consist of an addition to or extension of 
one’s body, but instead they produce incorporation of the foreign hand and replacement of 
one’s own hand. Intriguingly, the same phenomenon seems to be present at the 
physiological level. Moseley et al (2008) provided evidence that the experience of 
ownership during RHI is also accompanied by significant changes in the homeostatic 
regulation of the real hand, beyond changes in the subjective experience of one’s body. In 
particular, skin temperature of the real hand decreased if and when participants 
experienced the RHI (but see also Kammers, Rose, & Haggard, 2011 and Sadibolova & 
Longo, 2014). Additionally, the magnitude of the decrease in skin temperature on the 
participant’s own hand was positively correlated with the vividness of the illusion. 
Importantly, this effect occurred only as a result of the experience of ownership. Thus, a 
change in conscious experience of body-ownership has direct consequences for the 
homeostatic regulation of real body-parts that occur once participants experience the RHI, 
and not simply as the result of synchronous multisensory stimulation. Even more strikingly, 
histamine reactivity increased in the ‘rejected’ arm during the rubber hand illusion (Barnsley 
et al., 2012), implying that the interoceptive system begins to disown the real hand in favour 
of the prosthetic hand, an effect that recalls Damasio’s definition of ‘the self’ as ‘whatever 
the immune system defines as being part of the body’ (Damasio, 2003).  
Therefore, multisensory processes that update or disrupt the awareness of our physical self 
may in turn disrupt the physiological regulation of the self. The changes caused in the 
physiological regulation of the self as a result of the change in the conscious experience of 
body-ownership over and above multisensory integration suggests that various processes 
other than simply multisensory integration may be involved in generating, maintaining or 
disrupting the awareness of the bodily self (see section 3).  
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In terms of the brain areas that underpin body-ownership, functional neuroimaging studies 
on the RHI and lesion studies implicate a network of areas , comprised of premotor, 
temporoparietal and occipital areas, as well as the insula (for review see Tsakiris 2010; 
Blanke, Slater & Serino, 2015). The insula is ubiquitously activated in a wide range of tasks 
and is typically known as the main interoceptive hub of the brain (for a review see Craig, 
2009), but it has been shown that it is also engaged in the experience of body-ownership 
during the RHI (Tsakiris et al, 2007). Intriguingly, the hypothesis that the right posterior 
insula is linked to the experience of body-ownership is also supported by available evidence 
on somatoparaphrenia, a neuropsychological syndrome where loss of experienced 
ownership over one’s own limb is the key feature. A lesion mapping study that focused on 
patients with disturbed sense of body ownership (Baier & Karnath, 2008) revealed that the 
right posterior insula is indeed the critical structure involved in such phenomena.  
Beyond ownership of a limb, the same principles of exteroceptive multisensory integration 
have been used to probe questions of full-body-ownership. Ehrsson (2007) used 
synchronous or asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation to elicit out-of-body experiences: 
synchronous but not asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation induced a shift in the 1st person 
perspective such that participants experienced being located at some distance behind the 
visual image of their own body as if they were looking at someone else. Leggenhanger et al 
(2007) induced a full body illusion (see also Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008) by having participants 
view a virtual body presented at a distance of 2 m ahead of them through the use a 3D–
video head-mounted display. As with the RHI, after synchronous stimulation, participants 
felt as if the virtual body was their body. Multisensory integration can update the mental 
representation of one’s body, such as the sense of ownership of body-parts (Longo et al., 
2008) or whole body (Ehrsson, 2007; Leggenhanger et al., 2007; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008),  
the physical appearance of one’s body (Longo et al., 2009), and the more abstract narrative 
representations of one’s self (Bergouignan, Nyberg & Ehrsson, 2014). Taken together, these 
results speak in favor of an exteroceptive model of the self, within which self-awareness is 
highly malleable, subject to the influence of exteroception (i.e. the perception of the body 
from the outside). However, exteroceptive input represents only one set of channels of 
information available for self-awareness, as we are also interoceptively aware of our body. 
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3. The interoceptive model of the bodily self  
Interoception, as first suggested by Sherrington who coined the term in 1906 (Craig, 2009), 
is the body-to-brain axis of sensations originating from the internal body and its visceral 
organs that signal their physiological state, such as thirst, dyspnea, ‘air hunger’,  sensual 
touch, itch, penile stimulation, sexual arousal, coolness, warmth, exercise, heartbeat, 
distension of the bladder, stomach, and other internal organs. Interoceptive signals arise 
within four systems - the cardiovascular, respiratory, gastrointestinal and urogenital. Of 
those, the cardiovascular has emerged as the main focus of study of the interaction 
between the visceral body and the brain (Critchley & Harrison, 2013), because of the 
informationally rich and bidirectional connections between these two most important 
organs of the body, the heart and the brain. Moreover, psychological research into 
interoceptive awareness has focused mainly on cardiac awareness because of the known 
role that heart-brain interactions (and concomitant balance between the sympathetic and 
parasympathetic systems) play in emotion processing.  While vestibular and proprioceptive 
signals also seem to originate from within, interoception plays a unique role in allowing the 
brain to ensure the efficient physiological function of the organism (i.e. homeostasis). 
Interoception is therefore critical for ensuring the stability of the organism in a changing 
environment, in way that other systems are not.  
As with awareness of other sensory modalities, awareness of interoceptive states confers 
significant biological advantages. However, in contrast to the vast empirical data on visual or 
somatosensory awareness, our understanding of interoceptive awareness is limited by the 
difficulties in causally manipulating interoceptive states (e.g. controlling inputs to the 
system), as well as by the available measurement methods.  Research into interoceptive 
awareness has focused mainly on awareness of heartbeats because these are distinct events 
that can be easily measured, unlike other interoceptive changes. Heartbeat detection 
procedures typically require individuals to perceive and count the number of heartbeats 
occurring during short intervals, or to detect the a/synchronicity between individual 
heartbeats and external stimuli. Both methods produce measures of Interoceptive Accuracy 
(IAcc), which correlate with each other and with measures in other interoceptive modalities 
(for review see Garfinkel et al, 2015). There are significant inter-individual differences in 
performance, allowing us to distinguish between people with higher and lower IAcc. IAcc is 
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thought to reflect a trait-like sensitivity to one’s visceral signals that has important 
consequences for health, feelings and cognition. Individual differences in IAcc have been 
linked to mental health with very high IAcc predisposing to anxiety, while in patients with 
alexithymia, a condition characterized by difficulties in identifying and describing emotion, 
symptom severity is inversely related to IAcc. Low IAcc characterizes sufferers from 
depersonalisation disorder, those with personality disorders and psychosomatic complaints, 
and patients with eating disorders (for a review see Herbert & Pollatos, 2012). In healthy 
adults, research into interoceptive awareness has been almost exclusively concerned with 
emotion. IAcc is important for the intensity of emotional experience and emotion regulation 
(Wiens, 2005). Individuals with higher IAcc report higher arousal than people with lower 
IAcc, despite comparable physiological arousal, are more able to self-regulate their 
behaviour (Herbert & Pollatos, 2012), and tend to follow their intuitions more in decision-
making tasks (Dunn et al., 2010). Taken together, the available evidence, deriving mainly 
from the study of emotion and psychopathology, suggests that interoceptive awareness is 
important for emotional awareness and mental well-being.  
However, beyond these domains, cognitive neuroscience has indirectly revealed the 
ubiquitous role that interoception may play in cognitive processing and self-awareness. 
Countless functional neuroimaging studies have reported activations in the insula, the 
central interoceptive hub in the brain, across a wide range of tasks. Craig (2009) suggested 
that the common denominator of insula activity is the central role of this area in integrating 
bodily and environmental information to optimize homeostatic efficiency, and in 
representing the “material me” in the brain. Beyond homeostasis, a set of intriguing findings 
that relate to self-awareness have captured our attention (for a review see Craig, 2009; 
Tsakiris, 2010). Right anterior insula activity correlates with performance in IAcc (Critchley et 
al, 2004). Ronchi et al (2015) reported a single-case study showing that heartbeat awareness 
decreased after insular resection. Right mid-posterior insula activity correlates with body-
ownership experienced during the Rubber Hand Illusion, a paradigm that uses exteroceptive 
input (e.g. vision and touch) to study the bodily self, and the same area seems to be the 
critical lesion site for neurological disturbances in the sense of body ownership (Baier & 
Karnath, 2008). These findings suggest that the interoceptive and the exteroceptive sides of 
the bodily self are integrated from the posterior to anterior subregions across the insular 
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cortex (Simmons et al, 2013), that seems to underpin the experience of this body as mine, 
an experience that is the hallmark of the bodily self. Beyond the representation of the body, 
the insular cortex is also linked to affective processing of self and others, and a wide range 
of social cognition processes such as empathy (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012). Taken together, 
these findings suggest that, interoception may play a role for self-awareness that goes 
beyond its known role for emotion and phenomenal consciousness, and that awareness of 
the interoceptive body may be fundamental to the unity of the self because interoception is 
required for the experience of a unified, non-hollow self, and to its stability because 
interoception can counteract the ever-changing influence of exteroceptive signals. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the neuroimaging results showing where in the brain 
the interoceptive and exteroceptive sides of the self are integrated, they do not answer a 
fundamental psychological question: what is the functional importance of the interactions 
between the interoceptive and exteroceptive representations for the self in its natural 
embodiment and perhaps in the self’s social world?  
The first study that tested the potential link between exteroceptive and interoceptive 
awareness of the body  measured and quantified IAcc and compared this measure with the 
change in body-ownership caused by multisensory stimulation, using the RHI as a 
paradigmatic case of the exteroceptive self. Tsakiris et al (2011) observed a negative 
correlation between IAcc and RHI, such that people with lower IAcc showed a stronger RHI 
measured behaviourally and homeostatically (i.e. drop in skin temperature), suggesting that, 
in the absence of accurate interoceptive representations, one’s model (i.e representation) 
of self is predominantly exteroceptive. This was a seminal finding that it could not be 
predicted by existing accounts of interoceptive awareness or models of the exteroceptive 
self. While Moseley et al (2008) had shown how a change in the body-ownership during RHI 
affects homeostatic regulation, Tsakiris et al (2011) showed for the first time that both the 
experience of body-ownership and the same subsequent changes in homeostatic regulation 
are negatively correlated with levels of IAcc. These findings suggested an antagonism 
between interoceptive and exteroceptive cues in bodily self-awareness. Following that 
initial finding, the same negative correlation was observed in children aged 8 to 17 years 
(Schauder et al., 2015).  
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Since then, recent studies have tried to modify the conditions of multimodal stimulation by 
including cardiac feedback to examine in greater detail the potential role of interoceptive 
signals in creating a sense of body-ownership. More recent evidence for the integration of 
exteroceptive and interoceptive information in body-ownership comes from two virtual 
reality studies (Suzuki et al., 2013; Aspell et al., 2013). Suzuki and colleagues (2013) 
demonstrated that watching a virtual depiction of their own hand pulsing in synchrony with 
the participant’s heartbeats induced the subjective experience of ownership over the 
virtually projected hand. This effect was not observed when the cardiac signals were 
presented out-of-synchrony with the participants’ heartbeats. Interestingly, participants 
with higher IAcc experienced a stronger illusory sense of ownership over the virtual hand 
than participants with lower IAcc. Contrary to the results of Tsakiris et al. (2011), in this 
paradigm it was the people with higher IAcc who experience the greater proprioceptive 
drift. The important difference between these two experimental manipulations is that in the 
classic rubber hand illusion the interoceptive cues of the individuals with good heartbeat 
perception serve to anchor those participants in their own bodies and enable them to resist 
the illusion. However, in Suzuki et al.’s novel method, the salient interoceptive cues are now 
located on the true, filmed hand, predisposing people with higher interceptive awareness to 
recognise it as their real body part. 
Following similar methods of stimulation to Suzuki et al (2013), it was shown that causing an 
avatar to flash in synchrony with the participant’s own heartbeat (to enhance self-
identification with the avatar’s body) facilitates performance on a task that requires 
participants to judge the perspective of the avatar (Aspell, 2013), an effect analogous to the 
one reported following the classic induction of the full body illusion (Leggenhanger et al, 
2007). In addition to cardio-visual synchrony, respiration can also produce important effects 
in body-awareness. People who saw an image of their own torso flash in synchrony with 
their respiration experienced a stronger sense of self-location towards the virtual body than 
when the flashing was asynchronous (and also when compared with an inanimate control 
object), although they reported no sense of ownership (Adler, Herbelin, Similowski, & 
Blanke, 2014).Lastly, using another type of interoceptive stimulation, namely slow affective 
touch that activates CT afferents, Crucianelli and colleagues (2013) and van Stralen and 
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colleagues (2014) demonstrated how this kind of stimulation enhances the experience of 
body-ownership in the RHI. 
These intriguing findings suggest that the integration of sensory information across the 
interoceptive and exteroceptive domains via cardio-visual synchrony, but also synchrony 
between respiration and vision, can alter important and diverse facets of body-awareness, 
such as body-ownership. Moreover, given that levels of interoceptive accuracy seem to 
constrain the effects of exteroceptive signals on body-awareness, we could argue that, if the 
exteroceptive model of the self highlights the malleability of body-awareness given the 
striking effects that multisensory integration has on body-ownership (see section 2), the 
interoceptive model of the self seems to primarily serve the stability of the body and its 
mental representation in response to external changes, reflecting thus the biologically 
necessary balance between adaptability and stability. 
 
3. From the bodily self to others: multisensory integration and self-other boundaries   
The studies reviewed above have focused mainly on the representation of the self without 
an explicit reference to others or to social processes. However, self representations are 
essential not simply for the sake of self-awareness, but more so for the representation of 
the relationship between self and others, and the effects that such representations have on 
self-other interactions. A first step towards a more social dimension of the exteroceptive 
model of the bodily self was to investigate the extent to which current multisensory input 
may influence self-other boundaries. To that end, beyond ownership over body-parts, other 
studies have used the same method of multisensory integration (i.e. visuo-tactile 
stimulation) to ask whether similar changes would occur in the representation of one’s own 
face. Arguably, one’s face is the body part that most characterises self-appearance 
(Rochat,2015), and recognition of one’s face, as distinctive from others’, is a fundamental 
component of self-awareness (Gallup, 1970; but see Suddendorf and Butler, 2013). Tsakiris 
(2008) extended the paradigm of multisensory integration to self-face recognition to 
investigate whether the process that alters body-ownership may also alter more social 
representations of one’s self. In the Enfacement Illusion (Tsakiris, 2008; Sforza et al, 2011; 
Apps et al, 2015), watching another person’s face being touched synchronously with one’s 
own face evokes changes in self-face recognition, so that we perceive the other person’s 
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face as more similar to one’s own. Participants were stroked on their face while they were 
looking at the face of another unfamiliar individual being touched in synchrony or 
asynchrony, a procedure that we termed Interpersonal Multisensory Stimulation (IMS). 
Before and after IMS participants performed a self-recognition task. The results showed that 
synchronized multisensory signals had a significant effect on self-face recognition (see also 
Sforza et al, 2011; Tajadura-Jimenez, Coleman, Longo & Tsakiris, 2013; Tajadura-Jimenez & 
Tsakiris, 2014). Not only did participants subjectively rate the other’s face as physically more 
similar to their own after synchronous IMS (Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jimenez, Grehl & 
Tsakiris, 2012; Tsakiris, 2008), they also showed a shift in their ability to discriminate 
between their own and the other’s face in a psychophysical visual discrimination task. In one 
version of this task, participants were shown computer-manipulated images of their own 
face blended with varying percentages of the other’s facial features using morphing 
software. Participants were required, for each trial, to report whether the face looked more 
like their own face, or more like the other’s face. After synchronous IMS, participants 
accepted a larger percentage of the other’s facial features as their own face (Tajadura-
Jimenez, Grehl & Tsakiris, 2012), showing an increase in perceived physical self-resemblance 
of the other. Interestingly, similar to the RHI, individual traits of IAcc were shown to predict 
changes in self-other boundaries during the Enfacement Illusion (Tajadura-Jimenez et al, 
2012; Tajadura-Jimenez and Tsakiris, 2014), providing further support to the hypothesis that 
levels of interoceptive awareness may constrain the flexibility of self-other boundaries. 
Moreover, levels of autonomic arousal (i.e. Electrodermal Activity) in response to 
threatening stimuli presented on the model’s face were similarly affected by levels of IAcc; 
participants with lower IAcc displayed higher arousal to the threat perceived on the other’s 
face. These effects suggest that the mental representation of our self, such as self-face 
representation, is not solely derived from stable mnemonic representations, but instead 
these representations are susceptible to current multisensory evidence. 
The changes in perceived physical similarity between self and other in the Enfacement 
Illusion was a crucial finding as it suggested that participants’ visual representations of their 
own and another’s body had become partially overlapped, or shared.  In a way analogous to 
the effects of the RHI, the synchronous IMS in enfacement elicits an overlap, or sharing, of 
body representations between self and other. Given the putative role of shared body 
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representations in sociocognitive processing (Gallese & Sinigaglia 2011), the important next 
step was to investigate how the changes in body representation induced by multisensory 
integration could affect social cognition. 
Recent work has identified a number of social processes that are modulated by synchronous 
IMS. Early investigations of the experiential structure of the Enfacement Illusion not only 
found evidence of changes in perceived physical similarity between self and other, but also 
revealed a clear affective component, whereby participants perceived the other to be more 
trustworthy and attractive after synchronous IMS (Tajadura-Jimenez, Longo, Coleman & 
Tsakiris, 2012). The social consequences of IMS were further explored in more depth by 
Paladino, Mazzurega, Pavani and Schubert (2010) who showed that, following the 
Enfacement Illusion, participants rated the other as conceptually closer to themselves, and 
also ascribed them more self-like personality traits. In addition, Maister, Tsiakkas and 
Tsakiris (2013) reported that the illusion can enhance the recognition of emotional facial 
expressions. After participants experienced the enfacement illusion with an unfamiliar 
individual, they showed significant increases in speed and accuracy in the recognition of the 
facial expressions of that individual, specifically their expressions of fear. 
A more direct approach to social processes was proposed by Maister, Sebanz, Knoblich and 
Tsakiris (2013) who asked whether changes brought about by multisensory integration can 
extend to the social processing of an entire group. Light-skinned Caucasian participants 
experienced the rubber hand illusion over a dark-skinned hand, and the change in their 
implicit racial attitudes was measured using the Implicit Association Test (IAT). The 
experience of illusory ownership over the different-race hand was strongly correlated with 
increased implicit positive attitudes towards that race. Similar findings were subsequently 
reported using a virtual reality set-up in which participants embodied a different-race 
avatar. Again, changes in body ownership elicited by the procedure lead to a decrease in 
implicit racial biases against the embodied racial group (Peck, Seinfeld, Aglioti & Slater, 
2013), and similar effects were more recently reported for age-stereotypes (Banakou, 
Groten & Slater, 2013) and other higher order social and attitudinal processes (Osimo, 
Pizarro, Spanlang, & Slater, 2015). For example, embodying an avatar representing a 4-year-
old child resulted in a bias towards associating the self with child-like compared to adult-like 
categorizations, as measured using an IAT (Banakou, Groten & Slater, 2013). This study was 
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notable because it demonstrated a role of the self-association in attitude change, whereas 
previous research had investigated more generic positive or negative associations with the 
embodied social group. 
Taken together, these studies demonstrate that bodily illusions not only alter higher-level 
representations of the self and the other such as social or racial stereotypes, but also more 
fundamental, low-level processes in perceived physical similarity,  online social perception 
and attention. Although IMS affects a wide range of diverse social processes, these effects 
can be parsimoniously explained by an increase in perceived physical self-resemblance, as it 
has been shown that such changes in body ownership or self-face representations that allow 
us to incorporate another body or face may also increase ‘bodily resonance’ with that 
outgroup. Our perceptual and neural resonance with others’ bodily experiences is 
significantly reduced when observing an outgroup member (Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 
2010;.Gutsell, & Inzlicht, 2010; Serino, Giovagnoli  & Làdavas, 2009; Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 
2009). An example of this can be seen in the Visual Remapping of Touch effect, a 
phenomenon whereby our tactile sensitivity is enhanced when observing another person 
being touched. This effect, thought to be evidence of somatosensory resonance with others, 
is significantly reduced when the observed individual is a member of a racial or political 
outgroup (Serino, Giovagnoli  & Làdavas, 2009). In a recent study, the Enfacement Illusion 
was induced by exposing participants to two minutes of multisensory stimulation whilst 
viewing an out-group member’s face (Fini et al, 2013; see also Cardini et al, 2013 ). 
Immediately afterwards, participants’ tactile sensitivity was measured whilst they observed 
the out-group member’s face being touched. Results showed that the experience of 
identification with the out-group member’s face had increased the Visual Remapping of 
Touch effect up to the level normally associated with a same-race individual. 
These findings show that a change in the perception of a purely bodily aspect of the self, 
such as the ownership of one’s hand or the mental representation of one’s face ultimately 
alter not only associations with a higher-level concept of the self (Banakou, Groten & Slater, 
2013), but also the affective (Maister,Tsiakkas & Tsakiris, 2013) and social processing of 
others (Maister et al, 2013). What is the underlying mechanism that allows changes in body-
ownership and self-representation to influence the way we perceive and relate to others?  
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 As discussed earlier, experimentally induced modulations of body ownership and self-face 
representations enhance perceived physical similarity between self and other (Longo et al, 
2009; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jimenez, Grehl & Tsakiris, 2012; Tsakiris, 2008). It has 
been argued that such changes in perceived physical similarity between self and other than 
can in turn lead to new higher –level positive associations being formed between the self 
and others (Maister et al, 2015). The transition from bodily to more conceptual 
representations of self and other can be explained by the fact that others who come to be 
perceived as more physically similar to one’s self may activate self-representations. Even 
subliminal exposure to images of one’s own body automatically activates positive self-
concepts (Tao, Zhang Li, & Geng, 2012; Ma & Han, 2010), and therefore perceptions of self-
similar bodies may activate self-associations in the same way. Once self-concepts have been 
activated by others, the positive evaluations associated with self-concepts can be 
generalized to others, by virtue of their perceptual similarity to the self. In support of this, 
the classical conditioning literature has long posited that associative learning of likes and 
dislikes are based on perceptual similarity, and that this can occur outside of awareness (for 
a review see De Houwer, Thomas  & Baeyens, 2001). This process of evaluative conditioning 
has been shown to extend to social stimuli; individuals rapidly and unintentionally 
generalize affective processing to individuals who look physically similar (Verosky & 
Todorov, 2010). Such processes can explain how a newly established physical similarity 
between self and others can lead to a change in the conceptual representations of self and 
others. In addition to the reported social effects, the process described above points to the 
need to account for a plausible mechanism that can underpin the multifaceted aspects of 
one’s self  and its body, from higher-level (e.g. identity, stereotypes) to lower level (e.g. 
appearance) mental representations. Such accounts have been recently proposed within the 
framework of Predictive Coding.  
4. Towards a unifying theory of the (bodily) self 
The idea that there is more than one side to the self is as old as psychology but theories that 
integrate the interoceptive and exteroceptive sides of self have been lacking (Legrand & 
Ruby, 2009). Some theories have focused mostly on the idea of coherence (Zahavi, 2005), 
thus neglecting the fact that certain aspects of the self may be antagonistic or competitive. 
Others (Metzinger, 2003), inspired by Hume, have focused on antagonism to argue against 
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the unity of the self. We here provide a different approach by focussing on the dynamic 
relations between bodily modalities, so that processes of both integration and competition 
can be accounted for, contributing to the unity and stability of the bodily self, respectively.  
Predictive coding (PC) has emerged as a prominent unifying theory of cortical function to 
explain brain processes underlying perception, action and (more recently) interoception 
(Friston, 2010; Seth, 2013). According to the theory, incoming sensory data is compared 
with internal models, i.e. with the brain’s probabilistic ‘prediction’ (best guess) about the 
environmental causes that affect the organism’s nervous system. If predictions and data are 
not compatible, then ‘prediction errors’ arise. However, organisms must maintain their 
bodies within a narrow range of desirable states, and therefore prediction errors must be 
minimised. A central tenet of PC models is the free-energy principle that states that 
biological agents resist a natural tendency towards disorder in a constantly changing 
environment (Friston, 2005) that may also have considerable consequences for the stability 
of self-representations. In the long-term, this means that the brain as a whole minimises the 
average of surprise across all sensory systems, learning how best to model and predict 
incoming sensory input.  
We recently extended this framework to self-awareness to account for the malleability of 
the exteroceptive self (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014) and argued that one’s body is processed in a 
probabilistic manner as the most likely to be “me” (see Limanowski & Blankenburg, 2015 for 
empirical support). Such probabilistic representations are created through the integration of 
top-down ‘predictions’ about the body with  bottom-up “prediction errors” from unimodal 
sensory systems that are then explained away at higher levels of the hierarchy (i.e. in 
multisensory areas). In the case of bodily illusions, viewing touch on a different body evokes 
a sensation of touch on one’s own body, and this generates bottom-up error signals from 
unimodal sensory systems. Perceptual learning processes will update the body 
representation to first induce a sense of ownership over the new body and next to 
incorporate perceptual features of the other’s body, in order to minimise this error and 
maintain a continual sense of ‘mineness’. Therefore, this account can explain how 
synchronous multisensory stimulation, such as the one provided during the bodily illusions, 
can not only elicit fundamental changes in body ownership, but can also elicit a subsequent 
increase in perceived similarity between the bodies of self and other.  
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Of course, one’s self is not represented solely at a basic, perceptual level. The self is a 
multimodal, hierarchical construct containing both low-level, bodily representations as well 
as higher level attitudes and beliefs. On a predictive coding account, these different levels of 
representation continuously interact, as prediction errors, and when left unexplained at one 
level, they need to be processed and eliminated at a higher level of the hierarchy. Given the 
focus of PC accounts on complimentary hierarchical top-down and bottom-up processes, a 
change in low-level, perceptual representations of one’s own body in relation to the body of 
other creates errors further up in the processing hierarchy, as this new information now 
conflicts with more abstract, higher-order representations of oneself and the other. These 
errors must then be minimised in a similar way, by updating attitudes and beliefs held about 
one’s self and the other, ensuring that the consistency within the multimodal self-
representation is maintained (see also Moutousis et al, 2014 for a predictive coding 
approach to social cognition). 
Beyond the explanatory value that predictive models of the self have for the malleability of 
body-awareness and self-other representations, such models can also be used to account 
for the relation between exteroceptive and interoceptive representations of one’s body. For 
example, if we consider the experience of body-ownership during the RHI, the exteroceptive 
evidence suggests that what I am looking at (i.e. the rubber hand) is my hand. However if 
this is my hand, then there are interoceptive prediction errors which need to be explained 
away between how my true hand feels (i.e. the interoceptive prediction) and the fact that I 
cannot feel the rubber hand interoceptively (i.e the interoceptive prediction errors).  An 
important contribution of such free energy models (see also Seth, 2013) is the proposal that 
the self is hierarchically distributed and underpinned by many different types of 
information. Signals and predictions from any modality may thus be brought to bear to 
resolve a conflict between cues in another, including higher-level, abstract and amodal 
assumptions (predictions). Therefore, exteroceptive and interoceptive streams must be 
integrated for a body to be represented as “self”. What determines the weighting of the 
different streams?  
Both predictions and the incoming sensory data vary in the precision (i.e. reliability) of the 
information that they convey (e.g. how noisy they are). Sensory signals (and consequent 
prediction errors) that are compatible with only a narrow range of potential predictions 
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have ‘high precision’ and thus carry information that is reliable. By contrast, sensory signals 
with ‘low precision’ are compatible with a wide range of potential predictions such that the 
resulting imprecise prediction errors they set up are likely to be treated as unreliable 
information and consequently suppressed by a precise prediction. Precision is crucial when 
selecting information amongst various modalities because the brain preferentially weights 
signals that are the most precise in the given context. To experience body-ownership during 
the RHI, participants must form a percept that the prosthetic hand is their own, by 
minimising prediction errors across all available sensory modalities. Importantly in this 
context, information from any sensory modality can be used to explain away prediction 
error in any other (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014). It is precision that dictates which part of the 
conflicting evidence is presumed to be reliable. If their interoceptive signals are precise, this 
would explain why individuals with high IAcc experience a weaker body-ownership during 
the RHI by contrast with individuals with low IAcc. For higher IAcc the brain weights 
interoceptive predictions and prediction errors as more reliable compared to those with low 
IAcc, making them more resistant to the exteroceptive evidence. This account can also 
explain why in the case of ‘interoceptive rubber hand illusion’ (Suzuki et al, 2013, see also 
Aspell et al., 2013 for a similar full body illusion) it is the people with higher interoceptive 
accuracy who now experience the greater illusion, illustrating the crucial effect of context. 
The interoceptive cues in this version of the experiment indicate that the hand is one’s own 
because its visual appearance is congruent with the individual’s continually experienced 
updating of interoceptive priors. People for whom interoceptive prediction errors are 
precise (i.e. good heartbeat perceivers) are therefore now more, rather than less, likely to 
claim ownership of the virtual hand, as this experiment has demonstrated (Suzuki et al., 
2013). Therefore, individual differences in IAcc accuracy can be explained in terms of 
variations in the ‘precision’ with which interoceptive signals from within the body are 
represented (Friston, 2010;  Fotopoulou, 2013; Seth, 2013), and this precision-dependent 
account can also explain the effects that levels of IAcc may have on the exteroceptively-
driven representation of the self. 
Beyond the self, the distinction between self and other is crucial both for self-awareness 
and for awareness of other people because the brain must monitor whether sensations, 
events and mental states should be attributed to oneself or not. Correctly identifying the 
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origin of bodily and mental states is necessary for social relatedness. For example, how can I 
share the pain of another individual without forgetting it is not my pain? Emotional 
contagion, mimicry, body resonance, perspective-taking and theory of mind have been used 
to operationalize different facets of empathy which is considered as one of the hallmarks of 
social relatedness (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012; Decety, 2011), although its exact meaning is 
still debated. Aside from definitional disputes, a critical but unresolved issue is the question 
of “self-other” overlap (Preston & Hofelich, 2012). Put simply, “self-other” overlap is 
thought to arise when an observer engages in an isomorphic state (e.g. same emotion) to 
the person observed. However, what is or should be the extent of this overlap? Or, to turn 
the question around, to what degree can we distinguish between self and other at the very 
time that we are trying to relate to each other? 
The model put forward here proposes a role for interoception as a constituting element of 
the stability of bodily self that safeguards against self-other blurring. This paves the way for 
a new, hitherto untested, approach to the question of self-other relations. According to 
recent models of social cognition (Bird & Viding, 2014), the default modus operandi of the 
social brain is to represent one’s own self (e.g. one’s own perspective, emotion, beliefs). 
Switching from self to other, to achieve a partial co-representation of self and other, is 
therefore an effortful process that at least to some extent requires the attenuation of self-
representations (Bird & Viding, 2014). From the interoceptive viewpoint, the attenuation of 
self-representations that is required so that the other is better represented, needs to be 
extended to interoceptive feelings. According to this view, low IAcc may provide an 
advantage because the attenuation of interoceptive prediction errors may be 
computationally easier. Consider the case of emotion contagion, where exposure to 
someone else’s emotion brings about a similar affective state in the perceiver but without 
explicit awareness that this state should be attributed to the other individual. A lack of 
awareness of the origin of the affective state may indicate low IAcc, despite comparable 
levels of physiological reactivity between people with lower and higher IAcc (Dunn et al., 
2010). In the case of empathy, which, unlike emotion contagion it requires explicit 
knowledge of the origin of the emotion, it is unclear, and as yet empirically untested 
whether one needs first and foremost an accurate sense of one’s own body, as it is being 
affected by others, in order to sense the other. 
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An alternative prediction, motivated by the way in which interoception is conceptualized 
here , holds that understanding others requires a ‘good enough’ (i.e precise) representation 
of one’s own (interoceptive) states because the key element in representing others’ states is 
our awareness of how their states affect us. Moreover, this self-representation should 
display sufficient stability to prevent the blurring of self and other. Therefore, the 
hypothesis supported by the conceptualization of interoceptive awareness offered here is 
that one needs an accurate sense of one’s own body, in order to attend to and relate to 
others, as individuals distinct from one’s self.  Therefore, future studies on interoceptive 
awareness in social cognition can inform a new model of social relatedness motivated by 
the role that interoceptive representations play in shaping our sense of self and, as a 
consequence, the ways in which the self relates to others. 
Conclusion 
The predictive coding account of self-awareness presented here provides a plausible 
explanation of the often striking effects that have been reported in relation to bodily 
illusions over the last 20 years, as it explains how exteroceptive evidence can be used to 
minimize prediction errors during the construction of our body-awareness but also how 
exteroceptive with interoceptive information are integrated in this process.  In order to 
minimise prediction errors, the organism must learn over time to assign the best possible 
set of the weights and thus to optimise the relative precisions of predictions and prediction 
errors across all modalities. This process has large explanatory value when considering the 
interaction between interoceptive stability and the malleability of the exteroceptive self, as 
it explains individual differences in interoceptive or exteroceptive precision and their effects 
for the awareness of the bodily self, and of others. By appealing to a multidimensional self-
representation, in which both bodily and more abstract aspects of the self are bound in a 
coherent, supramodal construct, we can bridge the gap between multisensory (i.e. 
interoceptive and exteroceptive) representations involved in body ownership on the one 
hand, and the more conceptual or social representations involved in self-other relations on 
the other hand. The mechanisms suggested here provide us with an account of how changes 
in body ownership can close this gap in order to affect higher-level social processes. 
However, important questions remain unanswered. Presumably, trait levels of interoceptive 
awareness depend on specific developmental trajectories that till hitherto remain largely 
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under-investigated. Furthermore, despite the general appeal that predictive coding models 
have for researchers in the field of body- and self-awareness, direct empirical support has 
only recently started to be generated. Such challenges should and will be addressed in the 
near future.  
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